Operation Ladbroke, the invasion of Sicily, was a nighttime British glider operation with glider pilots from the British Glider Pilot Regiment flying American Waco CG–4A gliders, with 22 volunteer American glider pilots flying as copilots in mission LADBROKE. This was unprecedented since night glider assaults were not part of British airborne doctrine. Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, cabled Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor in North Africa before the scheduled mission, urging him to persuade General Eisenhower’s planners to change the mission from night to early dawn. His plea was denied. By 13 June 1943, 346 of the 500 CG–4As shipped to North Africa that March had been assembled by glider pilots and others. Only 136 of the 360 were used for Operation Ladbroke that also included 8 British Airspeed Horsa gliders, 111 C–47s, 25 British Albemarles and 8 Halifax bombers as tow planes.

Forty-two American glider pilots volunteered to train the British glider pilots in the CG–4A. They were placed on detached service to the British Glider Pilot Regiment. The 144 gliders participating in Operation Ladbroke were towed from six Tunisian airfields at 1842 hours on 9 July 1943 by C–47s and C–53s of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing. Shortly after takeoff six tow planes turned back because of shifting loads in gliders, another turned back when the jeep it was carrying broke loose from its tie downs.

Further into the mission three more gliders broke loose when the formation ran into strong winds and extremely turbulent air, and vanished with all hands. Two other tow planes became lost and returned to Tunisia. High winds at the release point coupled with inexperienced tow pilots led to 69 gliders being released too far from the coast of Sicily and were unable to make landfall. 605 officers and men were lost, 326 presumed to have drowned.

Only forty–nine CG–4As and five Horsas landed on Sicilian soil within a 10 mile radius of their LZs (Landing Zones). Allegedly, only five CG–4As and two British Horsas actually landed on their designated LZs. To make matters worse, eleven American C–47s and C–53s loaded with paratroopers were shot out of the sky by friendly fire from Allied ships participating in the invasion.

American Major General Joseph M. Swing, cited five major mission weaknesses:

1. Insufficient time spent in coordinating the air routes with all forces
2. Complexity of the flight route and the low degree of training for the navigators
3. The rigid naval policy of firing at any and all aircraft
4. The unfortunate timing of the airdrops directly after extensive enemy air attacks
5. The failure of some army ground commanders to warn all antiaircraft units of the impending airborne operations

In spite of the many difficulties encountered and the casualties incurred the objectives were taken and the mission considered a success. --Leon B Spencer

In his report to General Eisenhower, British General ’Boy‘ Browning placed all of the blame on the American Troop Carrier crews. Shama 20. More information on this can be found at "blame on American Troop Carrier crews" www.operation-ladbroke.com/tugs-to-blame-for-releasing-gliders-in-sea-operation-ladbroke-sicily/. However, the Planners of Operation Ladbroke had set the stage for the mistakes.

The planners rushed into a Sicilian invasion not allowing enough time to develop a ready force. As an example, there was not enough time for training of British Glider Pilots. According to American Glider Pilot Michael Samek each British glider pilot received only 4.5 hours of training in the CG-4A, of which, only 1.2 hours was at night and yet this was a night operation.

There were mandates and other circumstances which contributed to the disaster of LADBROKE:

1. Not enough training time for the British Glider Pilots. British glider pilots received only 4.5 hours of training in the CG–4A, only 1.2 hours of it at night.
2. The order that tug pilots were not to go over land. [NARA]
3. Orders were given to tug pilots not to go into flak. [NARA]
4. Orders were given that tug pilots were to release glider if glider did not release. [NARA, Samek]
5. There were inconsistencies in reports giving the release altitude for gliders. [NARA].
6. Not enough planes for the operation [NARA]
7. Weather was also a factor; a strong gale off the coast hindering glide time. [NARA]

Lt. Col Chatterton, Commanding Officer of the British Glider Pilot Regiment, defended the glider pilots in the report titled Summary of Ladbroke dated 20 July 1943.

The operation must be carried out by night, on to unknown country from the sea and landings were bound to meet with resistance by searchlight and A.A. fire. One of the main points was that the tug plane had to approach in such a way that they might reach base in safety, to be ready for the next operation. This point has signifcance in that the approach was bound by :

1. A low approach to avoid R.D.F
2. A release point which would allow the aircraft to be out of Ack-Ack range.
3. a minimum release height for the same reason.

Lt Col. Chatterton’s remarks on the glider pilots were:

The Glider Pilot, whether American or British, is properly trained and can pull off any type of landing by day or night.

But in his book The Wings of Pegasus he reverted to laying the blame on the glider pilots.

In the final analysis, it is important to remember that plans made in wartime are frequently less than perfect and weather is un-controllable. This was the first allied glider mission of the war and the mistakes were not repeated and lessons learned here were valuable for the future missions.

FUSTAIN was a relatively small glider mission. Nineteen gliders, eight WACO [CG-4A] and eleven Horsa gliders were used. They were delivering four 6 pounders and their crews from the 1st Airlanding Anti Tank Battery to secure the Primosole Bridge They were to land in two separate landing zones, LZ 7, 2,000 yards west of the bridge and LZ 8, 500 yards to the south. The gliders would be released at 500 feet over LAND at the LZs.

British Glider Pilots refused to allow the USAAF tow pilots to tow their gliders do to the debacle of LADBROKE, yet, the orders that were mostly responsible for the disaster of LADBROKE were not given to the British tow pilots. They were not ordered to release if the glider did not release, nor given orders to release 3,000 yards while over sea nor told to stay out of flak to keep planes undamaged for the next mission. Instead, for FUSTIAN, gliders were released over land near their LZ at 500 feet. Pathfinders marked the gliders LZ with a green light for LZ7 and an orange light for LZ8. Four American glider pilots were asked to fly the FUSTIAN mission as copilots.

Chalk 115 Tyrus T LOCKHART- Aborted - Aircraft crashed on take-off, glider released okay and made a successful landing but was unable to take off again within the time frame needed to go in with the other gliders. It is also possible that another tug was not available.

Chalk 116 Floyd G MARTIN - Tow was successful, however, the intercom never worked during flight. They released over LZ, at 0111 hours at 500 feet. They were caught in enemy fire and their starboard wing was hit causing them to side slip and they crashed landed in the outer defenses of Catania Airfield where machine gun fire was experienced all around. Unable to unload their 6 pounder due to enemy activity.

Chalk 117 Roger R ZENOBY Their tow was excellent and their intercom with tug was okay. They released at 800 ft in LZ with a successful landing except undercarriage was damaged and they could not get the jeep out. They were also receiving machine gun fire.

Chalk 118 Clement A CASELLA - Aborted - Pilot released at 2101 hours near M’Saken, Pilot found aircraft uncontrollable.

Two of the four glider pilots who flew FUSTIAN died before the war ended. CASELLA and MARTIN were killed in either training or in other combat missions.